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Abstract. This paper builds on the existing literature to better explain the tax assignment choices
made by countries in different economic circumstances. In particular, we explain why the degree of tax
autonomy given to subnational governments is significantly greater in industrial than in developing
countries, even when adjustment is made for differences in income level. We consider several arguments for this disparity. First, electoral regimes are not in place for the accountability gains to be fully
captured. Second, tax decentralization may result in unacceptable fiscal disparities, and, third, tax
administration costs are higher for subnational governments and there is not enough incentive to take
steps to lower them. Finally, and contrary to expectations, we do not find empirical evidence that
giving more discretionary powers to subnational governments in developing countries will lead to
a crowding out of central revenues, but we do find this result for industrial countries.

Most students of fiscal decentralization have been concerned with explaining why
countries decentralize expenditure decisions (Oates, 1972) and with empirical analysis of
the practice (Bahl and Wallace, 2005; Letelier, 2005). More recently, the tax assignment
part of the story has drawn research attention (Bahl and Bird, 2008; Löpez-Laborda et al,
2007).
Some countriesöfor example, the US and Canadaöhave carried tax decentralization quite far. In many other countries, particularly low-income countries and those
in transition, tax assignment has not been an important part of the decentralization
strategy. This difference between industrialized and lower income countries is usually
explained by tax administration capacity, historical traditions of centralization, and
macroeconomic policy concerns. In fact, the story is more complicated and there is
much still to be learned about why governments (or constitutions) make the revenue
assignment decisions that they do.
The goal in this paper is to build on the existing literature to better explain the
choices actually made by countries in different economic circumstances. We begin with
a summary of the theory of subnational tax autonomy, and the taxing rules that have
been taken from this theory. We then turn to a review of how the practice follows
the theory, and to four amendments to the existing theory that can help explain the
international practice. These amendments to the existing model can help us understand
better why tax assignment has gone no further than it has, particularly in low-income
and transition countries. We conclude by viewing these findings in a perspective
of political economy and suggesting the policy implications.
The theory
The traditional starting point for thinking about tax assignment is Musgrave's (1983)
multilevel budget framework that would assign the stabilization and distribution functions to the central government and allocation responsibility to the local governments.
This division of responsibility leads to general guidance about the placement of various
instruments of taxation at the central, `middle', and local levels of government.
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Progressive taxes with a distributional goal and taxes containing automatic stabilizers
would be left with the central government. Subnational governments would rely mostly
on benefit taxes levied against relatively immobile bases.
Most economists still hold to the Musgrave rules as the basic organizing principles
for a fiscal federalism. But the theory and certainly the practice have moved on, and
competing hypotheses have been offered about the motives that drive governments
to make the tax decisions that they do. This work has focused on the importance
of competition among subnational governments as a way of controlling the size of
governments (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980), on taxing nonresidents for benefits
received (Oates, 1998), and on the political economy of tax assignment (Hettich and
Winer, 1999). These views have helped make the case for a claim on mobile tax bases
by subnational governments. In terms of the contemporary practice, some subnational
governments now have taken on a substantial redistribution role, regularly use tax
policy to stimulate their economies, and have been assigned major expenditure responsibilities. The case has been made that the prospect of economic dividends has become
a driving force behind decentralization (Rodr|¨ guez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). Further,
`things have changed'. Economic integration in Europe and the reality of elected
subnational government in the developing countries have stimulated the demand for
fiscal decentralization (Bahl, 2008; Stegarescu, 2009).
The evolving theory of tax assignment has led to a general set of taxing rules that
many researchers and practitioners use as the take-off point in designing subnational
government tax policy (McLure, 1998). These `rules' include assigning enough taxing
powers to local governments to allow them to cover the cost of locally provided
services, relying on user charges whenever local services can be priced, restricting
subnational governments from exporting more tax burdens than expenditure benefits,
and devolving only those tax instruments that can be administered at reasonable cost.
If all of these rules were followed to the letter, there surely would be no subnational
government taxes. Even taxes on the supposedly immobile bases involve some exporting to nonbeneficiaries (eg nonresidential property taxes), preferential treatments are
unavoidable (eg small traders can evade the business license tax), and full cost recovery
on essential services through user charges can bring social unrest. In some cases even
the letter is not clearöfor example, the meaning of `administration at reasonable cost'.
So, there is an implicit qualifying statement for all of these rules öthat a good local
tax will `approximately' pass these tests. The policy question is how far to push the
envelope.
The practice
With these considerations and qualifications taken into account, can it be concluded
that there are tax choices available to subnational governments that will generate
adequate revenue? Are the choices more limited for developing and transition versus
industrial countries? Do the choices that have been made conform with the principles
for good revenue assignment?
Individual income tax

A residence-based individual income tax can meet most of the tests for a good
subnational government tax. It can generate significant revenue from an elastic tax
base. It is roughly consistent with economic efficiency goals in that the burden falls
mostly on those who benefit from the services provided. However, correspondence
problems do arise with respect to those who cross subnational government boundaries
to reach their place of work, and some provision must be made for charging them for
benefits received. If the tax is levied according to place of employment, some portion
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of the tax burden will be exported from the taxing jurisdiction. The employment-based
model would also provide an incentive for jobs to migrate to lower taxing jurisdictions.
Since the residence-based model is much preferred, subnational government income
taxes work best if levied by jurisdictions that cover most of the commuting range.
In the industrial countries subnational government income tax administration is
feasible (OECD, 2006; Timofeev and Mart|¨ nez-Väzquez, 2004). The pay-as-you-earn
portion can be assessed and collected at the place of work with relatively little
difficulty. The `hard to tax' informal sector should be no more difficult a task for
subnational governments than it is for the central government, and there is no reason
to believe that the collection rate will be any lower under a decentralized than under a
centralized tax system. Income taxes on capital sources (dividends, interest, rents) can
be easily collected by states and provinces if there are information-sharing agreements
with the central government. Moreover, administrative difficulties can be circumvented
by a piggyback arrangement where the central government defines the base and takes
responsibility for collection while allowing local governments to set surrates.
Slack (2006, pages 106 ^ 107) reports that income taxes represent the most important source of subnational government tax revenues in thirteen of the twenty-seven
OECD countries. The approach to subnational government income taxation, however,
varies among countries. The US model is for a state government tax, where there is
discretion to define the tax rate and the tax base. Most US states begin with various
lines on the federal income tax form, and build up their own base. In many states the
tax structure is simple but in some cases it is complex and includes a progressive rate
structure. In eleven states local third-tier governments are allowed to levy a further
surcharge on the state base (Schroeder, 2006). In a handful of states there is no
individual income tax. State (provincial) and local governments account for about
20% of all individual income taxes raised in the US, and about 40% in Canada where
there are no local income taxes. Provincial personal income taxes in Canada are
collected by the federal government except in Quebec province.
The Swiss model is similar to that of the United States. Cantons levy an individual
income tax and also permit local governments (communes) to levy surcharges at locally
established rates on the cantonal income taxes. Like some US state government income
taxes, the Swiss subnational government income taxes are not fully harmonized with the
central income tax.
The case of Spain is quite different. The regions are divided into a special charter
group and a common regime group. The former may levy a personal income tax and
have discretion to set the rate that applies to their share of total collections. But the tax
base is common with the central government and collection is centralized. So, for these
regions there is an element of piggybacking. In the case of the latter regions the
subnational governments have autonomy over income tax policy and administration,
much as is the case for US states (Löpez-Laborda et al, 2007).
Under the Nordic model (Lotz, 2006; OECD, 2006) the central government collects
the tax, but local governments have discretion to set their local tax rate. In Norway,
however, local governments may not exceed a centrally set maximum rate and most
local governments are at the ceiling. These local income taxes are levied at a flat rate
on the same tax base as the national income tax except in Sweden where it is an earned
income tax.
The German arrangement is unique. The La«nder are responsible for collection, but
have no authority to set the tax rate or determine the tax base. In effect there are no
subnational government income taxes in Germany. State governments in Australia levy
a payroll tax because they are denied access to broad-based income taxes (Freebairn,
2002).
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Administrative considerations rule out residence-based subnational government
income taxes in most low-income countries. Very few subnational governments have
the ability to maintain a tax roll, or to do the necessary audit to police the compliance.
Even under a piggyback arrangement ö which gets around these administrative
constraints ö the tax base would be concentrated in a very few local governments
and most local governments would be shut out. Two other forces push towards
centralization of the individual income tax. One is that even central governments
often have trouble collecting much from the personal income tax (Bird and Zolt,
2005). The second reason is that income tax policy often involves income distribution goals and this is perceived to be the exclusive responsibility of the central
government.
In a number of transition economies, subnational governments have been assigned
significant shares of income tax revenue. At present in Russia, for example, 100% of
individual income tax revenues are assigned to subnational governments (Mart|¨ nezVäzquez et al, 2006). A 60% share is allocated to provincial governments in China.
Dillinger's (2007) review of the practice in eight eastern European countries indicates
that the individual income tax sharing rate varies from a 94% allocation to local
governments in Slovakia to 30% in the Czech Republic and Poland. In none of these
countries, however, do local governments have any significant freedom in establishing
the tax rate.
Company income tax

Many who study revenue assignment argue that the company income tax is not a good
choice for subnational governments (McLure, 1998; Mart|¨ nez-Väzquez, 2008). To the
extent that the incidence of the tax is shifted backwards to owners of the firms, or
forward to consumers of the product, it is not likely borne by local residents. Hence
it fails to match the beneficiaries of locally provided services with those who are
burdened by the tax.
Countries usually try to trick the system out of this undesirable tax exporting effect
by devising a formula to give every province where the company produces or sells its
product a claim on some part of the tax base. But these allocation formulae give rough
justice at best and few would argue that they are a good way to convert the company
income tax to a destination-based levy. The United States has learned well the great
problems that come with trying to prorate the net income of national companies
across state boundaries (McLure, 1980). Similar allocation problems are observed in
Switzerland (Spahn and Fo«ttinger, 1997).
Other problems with a subnational government company income tax are no less
worrisome: the tax base (profit) is cyclically unstable, capital is mobile, and provincial
and local government revenues can be affected by changes in central government tax or
industrial policy. These problems notwithstanding, some industrial countries do assign
the corporate income tax to subnational governments. It accounts for about 4% of
state and local government tax revenues in the United States. In Switzerland, Spain,
Japan, Italy, and Canada, subnational governments tax business income.
The developing countries make little, if any, use of company income taxes at
the subnational government level. Subnational governments in transition countries,
however, do depend on enterprise income taxes. In China enterprise income taxes
are a major source of provincial government revenues, but the central government
determines the tax rate and the tax base. Such tax-sharing arrangements are better
thought of as intergovernmental fiscal transfers.
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Consumption taxes

General sales taxes might be levied on turnover, at the retail level, or against value
added. In fact, general sales taxes in any of these forms are not often used by
subnational governments, even in OECD countries, though the United States
and Canada are notable exceptions. The practice suggests that the `decentralizing'
European countries have settled on assigning general consumption taxes to the
center and allowing the subnational governments to share the income tax base. In
the United States there is a de facto separation of sales tax powers: most states rely
heavily on a retail sales tax and there is no national sales tax. In Canada the sales tax
field is shared by the federal and provincial governments
General sales taxes of any type are a difficult proposition for subnational government in developing countries, mostly for administrative reasons (Bahl and Bird, 2008).
A gross receipts tax levied on an origin basis (mostly on importers and manufacturers)
can be revenue productive, but creates distortions by shifting tax burdens from producing to consuming regions and by its pyramiding effect. Relatively few subnational
governments in the developing world rely heavily on general sales taxes, though
Brazil and Argentina are important exceptions. Selective sales taxes and excises are
more manageable for developing countries but still are little used by subnational
governments.
Another version of the assignment of general consumption taxes is the revenue sharing
practiced in transition countries, but, as noted above, these are more appropriately thought
of as intergovernmental transfers.
General sales tax (VAT)
The only well-functioning, destination-based subnational value-added taxes (VATs)
now in existence are those in Canada (Bird and Gendron, 2007). Canadian experience
shows that, with good tax administration and an existing federal VAT, it is perfectly
feasible to operate a VAT at the subnational level on a destination basis.
In most developing countries there is no realistic prospect that the tax administration will be able to support a subnational government VAT. In addition to the
administration constraint, there are concerns about the tax treatment of international trade and problems arising from interstate trade. For most countries the
issue is that subnational VATs are distortionary if levied on an origin basis, and
unworkable if levied on a destination basis (Bahl and Bird, 2008).
Still, there are exceptions. Brazil relies heavily on an origin-based subnational
government VAT. State governments have autonomy in rate setting and compete for
investment by offering fiscal incentives. The resulting `fiscal war' has been an important factor behind the call for reform of the Brazilian VAT (Rezende and Afonso,
2006). India has implemented a state-level VAT, but is still working out the details of
how it will operate, particularly with respect to interstate trade (Babita et al, 2008;
Rao, 2008). Pakistan is attempting to implement a subnational VAT on services while
the VAT on goods will be a national tax.
Retail sales and gross receipts taxes
The retail sales tax is an important source of revenue in most US states. The tax rates
and bases are determined by the individual states. In some states local governments
also levy sales taxes. The major problems with this tax in the US have to do with
the difficulties with taxing services and with the failure to tax internet purchases.
With the shift in spending patterns toward the consumption of services, and with
internet purchasing on the rise, there is considerable erosion of the state government
revenue base (Mazerov, 2009). The taxation of electronic purchases is held back
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by legal rulings.(1) The taxation of services is limited by administrative considerations
and by a historical tradition of not taxing services, but this exclusion introduces
significant horizontal inequities in the system.
Subnational governments in developing countries do make use of gross receipts
taxes. The major own-source revenue of Brazilian municipalities is a gross receipts tax
on services, Imposto Sobre Servic°os (ISS), almost all of which is collected by the largest
municipalities (Rezende and Garson, 2006). The ISS and the urban property tax
together account for about 60% of total municipal government tax revenue. National
law fixes the minimum rate at 2%. Maximum rates differ by type of service, with the
usual maximum being 5% of gross revenue. Within this range local governments may
choose the tax rate. Provincial governments in Pakistan are empowered to levy a sales
tax on the consumption of services, but it yields little revenue.
Buenos Aires, both city and province, levies a gross receipts tax. The tax rate varies
widely by type of product and there are the expected cascading problems. Colombian
municipalities also derive much of their revenue from a gross receipts tax. The business
tax in the Philippines is levied on gross receipts and accounts for about 30% of
revenues (Taliercio, 2005).
All of these taxes are levied on an origin basis, so, depending on competition
and demand elasticities, may be guilty of tax exporting. Moreover, there is the `headquarters problem' which arises because national firms tend to pay tax for all branches
at the headquarters location. The headquarters city therefore receives the revenues
under an origin-based system. In fact, for years there have been calls for replacing
the gross receipts tax in Buenos Aires with a VAT. But there has been little action, in
part because of the important revenue role that this tax plays and the political strength
of subnational governments.
Excise taxes
Selective sales taxes are a potentially significant source of regional government revenue
(McLure, 1998). Such taxes can be easily administered by regional governments and
lend themselves to regionally differentiated rate determination. Moreover, if applied on
a destination basis, subnational government excise taxes can avoid the tax exporting
problem. There also may be a social cost argument for subnational government
excisesöfor example, on alcohol and tobaccoöto the extent that regional governments are responsible for traffic safety, hospitals, and health expenditures öand on
vehicles and fuel where subnational governments are responsible for road maintenance.
In practice, subnational government excise taxes work well in industrial countries
because administration capabilities allow taxation on a destination basis.
The case for assignment of excise taxes to subnational governments in developing
countries is not so strong, for two reasons. First, special excises on petroleum, liquor,
beer, and tobacco are of significant revenue importance to central governments, and
not likely to be surrendered to decentralization. Second, administrative constraints
limit the degree to which a destination-based excise could be implemented in most
developing countries (Cnossen, 2006).
The strongest economic and administrative case for regional (and perhaps even
local) excises is with respect to vehicle-related taxes (Bahl and Bird, 2008; Bahl and
Linn, 1992). The most important tax on automobiles from a revenue perspective is the
fuel tax, which, in fact, is used by subnational governments in some OECD countries.(2)
(1) The US Supreme Court ruled that state and local governments can require only sellers with
a legal presence in the state to collect the sales tax [Quill v. North Dakota, 112 US 298 (1992)].
(2) For a review of the practice, see Newbery (2005).
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The case for provincial-level motor fuel taxes in developing countries is less easily
made. States and provinces in developing countries could impose fuel taxes, but rates
could not differ much from those imposed by neighbors because of the mobility of the
tax base and because of evasion. Collection at the pump is usually difficult. Differential
provincial fuel taxes can, as a rule, be imposed at the refinery or wholesale level, with
the refiner or wholesaler acting as a collection agent for the states, remitting taxes in
accordance with fuel shipments. In practice, provincial taxation of motor fuels has
been constrained because central governments are reluctant to allow encroachment
on its petroleum excise base, because fuel prices are so sensitive a political issue that
the center desires complete control, and because provincial governments themselves
are not anxious to take on the political cost that might come with heavier taxation of
motor vehicle use. A shared tax with the provincial government might be a more
feasible way to tap the motor fuel base.
Motor vehicles may also be taxed with a number of other instruments. These
include tolls and an appropriate set of annual automobile (and driver) license fees.
The annual license for operating a motor vehicle is easily administered and at an
appropriate rate could be revenue productive. An alternative administrative arrangement is revenue sharing of license taxes with a higher level of government. For
example, in Brazil the state government shares 50% of motor vehicle license revenues
with municipalities according to the place of registration.
Property and land taxes

Virtually all countries assign the property tax to local governments. In the industrialized
countries and in many developing and transition countries, these local governments are
given rate-setting powers. Administration of the tax is often divided between the central
(or state) government and the local government, but there is no one dominant pattern
on the division of administrative duties. In some cases higher level governments develop
the cadastre and even do the valuation work, while local governments focus on
collections. In other countries valuation is a local function, especially in the larger
cities. Most countries assign responsibility for collections to the local level.
The property tax passes many of the tests of a good subnational government tax.
The base is broad and the tax can be revenue productive at reasonable levels of the
statutory rate. Typically, revenues are stable over the business cycle. There is a rough
jurisdictional correspondence between the benefits received from services financed by
the tax and the burden distribution. The exception to this rule is the burden of taxes on
some nonresidential properties that are not owned by local residents, and/or that sell
products outside the local area. The property tax fails the tests for a good subnational
government tax in terms of its high administrative cost and its unpopularity with
voters.
There is always controversy about the revenue yield of the property taxöthat is,
about whether its burden is too high or about whether it contributes enough revenue
to the financing of local public services. The revenue yield from the property tax
in OECD countries is above 2% of GDP, nearly four times higher than the yield in
developing countries.
The discussion about property tax practices in low-income countries is mostly
pointed toward its almost uniformly weak revenue performance. On average, it
accounts for well less than 1% of GDP in developing countries. Arguably the most
important reason is that the property tax works best as a local government tax, and
fiscal decentralization has not been as embraced in developing as in industrialized
countries. Bahl and Mart|¨ nez-Väzquez (2008) use data from a panel of seventy countries for 1990, 1995, and 2000 to show a significant positive effect of both expenditure
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decentralization and the level of per capita GDP on the level of the effective property
tax rate. Lower income countries are less decentralized and therefore use the
property tax less.
The property tax offers several advantages as a good local tax in developing
countries. Real property is visible and can be reached by local government administrations, and, with effort, effective administration is possible (De Cesare, 2004). The local
governments have a significant comparative advantage in administering the property
tax because of their familiarity with the local economy and their related regulatory
powers (eg issuing building permits and business licenses, making land-use plans).
The distribution of the tax burden is progressive because land ownership is concentrated in the upper income brackets. The revenue potential is well above amounts now
collected in most developing countries. A major problem is that delays in general
revaluation are commonplace, significantly lowering the revenue ^ income elasticity.
Because the property tax is so unpopular in developing countries, it has few champions
among elected officials.
Some unanswered questions
What we can learn from the above is that the practice of taxation more or less follows
the theory in the industrialized countries, but does not match up as well in the
developing countries. Moreover, while the subnational government expenditure share
of GDP is about twice as high in industrial as in developing countries, the tax share is
about five times higher (table 1).
Table 1. Subnational government tax revenues as a percentage of GDP (source: computed from
IMF, 1980 ^ 2006).
Decade

OECD
Transition
Developing

1970s

1980s

1990s

2000s

8.59
(15)

9.49
(15)
7.55
(3)
1.36
(18)

8.61
(20)
4.62
(19)
1.98
(25)

7.8
(15)
4.55
(21)
1.57
(23)

1.42
(18)

Note: The average value for the decade is reported in each cell; the number of countries
reporting is shown in parentheses.

The existing theory could do a better job of explaining the practice in industrial versus
developing countries if it were amended to account for four factors: (a) subnational
governments in developing countries may not capture the efficiency gains from having
more taxing power; (b) tax decentralization would lead to fiscal disparities that would
require central intervention; (c) neither central nor local governments may be committed to
lowering the high cost of subnational government tax administration; and (d) higher levels
of revenue mobilization by subnational governments may crowd out central government
taxes. These four considerations are discussed below.
Accountability

If consumer voters at the subnational government level can choose the package of
services they want, they will be willing to pay a higher (tax) price for this package. If
they are constrained to a lower level of taxation by administration weaknesses or by
limited taxing powers, they will suffer a welfare loss. If they are able to pay for the
services with local taxes, but receive a lesser quality of services than they contracted
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for, they will suffer a welfare loss. Elected local officials will be held accountable for
delivering the quality of services for which the voter paid. The model works by
exit (more so in industrialized than in developing countries) and it works by voice
vote.
The accountability model supports the efficiency case for fiscal decentralization,
but it probably makes unrealistic assumptions about the extent to which citizens can
vote public services to their desired levels (Lockwood, 2006). This is true everywhere
but especially in the developing countries. The electoral process might not be open and
contested (China and Vietnam) or elections may have been suspended (Nepal). Information is more imperfect, voters are less mobile, and in some cases voters have not
learned how to use the vote to hold their officials accountable. In all countries voters
are forced to choose among candidates based on a full line of issues rather than on
simple issues such as the level of public output. However, it also can be argued that
public officials can be graded according to their performance relative to that in other
jurisdictions (Beasley and Case, 1995).
What we might conclude is that the efficiency gains from assigning more taxing
powers to subnational governments are more likely to be realized in industrial than
in developing countries. All else being the same, this would dampen the relative
demand for subnational government taxing powers in less-developed countries and
is another explanation for the large gap between revenue mobilization in developing
and industrialized countries.
Another complication is that the central (or state) government may take policy
actions that weaken the accountability of elected officials to voters. This might happen
if local governments take on a role of enabling service delivery (Helmsing, 2002) rather
than directly delivering services. Moreover, by providing financing to subnational
governments through intergovernmental transfers, higher level governments can delink
the tax and expenditure sides of the fiscal equation. Elected officials will no longer be
as accountable to voters as would have been the case if the desired public service
package had been financed by local taxes. In this case taxpayers will tie service benefits
more to the level of grants from higher level governments than to the level of local
taxes. Even more likely, the benefits from increased subnational government taxes
could be so negligible as to go unnoticed. The same will be true in industrialized
countries with highly centralized fiscal systems, such as Australia or Germany. Spahn
and Fo«ttinger (1997, page 245) note that the highly centralized German system is so
complicated that it is ``impossible for voters and taxpayers to identify which government
spends or taxes, and for what purpose.''
Equalization

A concern with tax assignment in many countries is equalization öthat is, the taxable
capacity and the administrative capacity is significantly greater in the wealthy regions.
More local taxing powers in this case would lead to greater fiscal disparities. This
is most problematic in the case of low-income countries because regional variations
in taxable capacity are greater (Hofman and Guerra, 2007). Countries have dealt with
this issue in four different ways. First, in Denmark an equalization formula is in place
whereby any revenue collected that exceeds a specified percentage of the difference
between estimated revenue potential and estimated expenditure needs is paid to an
equalization fund which is distributed to local governments whose needs exceed their
revenue potential. In Sweden, Spain, and Japan a similar equalization formula is used.
While fiscal disparities can be significantly reduced under such a system, it comes
at a cost. The tax retained from an additional dollar of income taxes raised is lowered.
This has led to a dampening of local government tax effort (OECD, 2006).
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Second, under a derivation-based sharing system, such as in China, the subnational
governments have no taxing powers. However, in the 1980s and 1990s when
they perceived that their share of VAT and income tax reached too low a level, they
reacted by gaming the system to transfer revenues from shared taxes to informal
levies that were dedicated to extrabudgetary accounts. In effect, the subnational
governments were able to retain a greater share of the revenue collected. This
practice was curtailed by a recentralization reform of the intergovernmental fiscal
system in 1994 (Bahl, 1999).
Third, some countries use the disparities concern to deny significant taxing powers
to subnational governments. The Netherlands and Germany are examples for the
OECD. In the case of many developing countries the argument might be that higher
central taxes are needed to support an equalization transfer.
Finally, some countries leave the tax-created disparities in place but attempt to
resolve the disparities problem with a system of intergovernmental transfers from
higher level governments, or by the direct assumption of expenditure responsibility
by higher level governments. The South African government, for example, allowed
cities to levy a payroll and turnover tax, but equalized with an `equitable shares' grant
that allocated about one half as great a per capita amount to rich than to poorer local
governments.
Tax administration

In the industrial countries tax administration is not usually a binding constraint in
the tax assignment decision. Subnational governments assess and collect even broadbased taxes. This is primarily because the state or province-level tax administration
often is efficient, and where this is not the case the central government serves as
the collection agent. The industrialized countries are able to take advantage of the
formality of their economies to mix and match tax administration styles to find an
administrative regime that works (Timofeev and Mart|¨ nez-Väzquez, 2004). In the US,
federal ^ state cooperation allows the state governments to effectively administer the
personal income tax by tying into a particular line on the federal return. The Swiss
cantons administer their income tax, and the German La«nder collect the central
income tax. In the Nordic countries, however, the subnational government income
tax is administered by the central government.
By contrast, administration is usually the most binding constraint on the tax
assignment decision in developing countries. Many policy analyses and country studies
focus on the comparative advantage of the central government in tax collection as a
reason why the level of subnational government taxation should be low. The tax
administration costs can be factored into the constrained maximization model as a
higher price for tax-financed local public services. The level of subnational government
taxation, then, would depend on the price elasticity of demand for these goods. The
higher the cost of local versus central tax administration, the less the demand, and
the lower the level of tax assignment to subnational governments.
A second constraint to increased subnational government taxes is the perception
that the learning curve for the development of administrative skills is not very
steep. The resources necessary to finance these improvements are limited, there
might be little new revenue mobilization from this investment for a number of years,
and in many cases the weak central government tax administration is thought to
have first call on any such investment. During the waiting period for subnational
government tax administration efficiency to take hold, voters may lose patience and
confidence.
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Finally, there is the question of how one might monitor the performance of
subnational government tax administration ö for example, in order to assess the
success of an investment in upgrading the local system. The question of a `reasonable'
administrative cost for subnational governments is rarely pinned down in research
on this subject. Even the concept of collection cost is not generally agreed to. The
common practice is to measure administrative cost against collections öfor example,
`the cost should be less than 3% of collections'. The thinking here is flawed. If the goal
is to choose a tax based in part on its collection cost, the better measure would be the
cost of collecting some normative, target amount.
What we conclude from this is that the higher cost of tax administration at the
subnational government level in developing countries is an important reason for
the low level of own-source revenues assigned to state and local governments. But,
in some ways, poor tax administration is as much a `whipping boy' as a justification.
Central governments (and international agencies) could long ago have begun a
serious investment in upgrading administrative capacity at the subnational government level, or installing piggyback arrangements with local rate-setting powers
and no local administrative responsibilities. When one takes the long view, the
administrative rationale for limited assignment of taxing powers to subnational
governments may be less about administration than about a fear of the consequences
of fiscal decentralization.
Crowding out

An important determinant of the level of revenue mobilization is intergovernmental tax
competition. If subnational government taxation crowds out central government taxation
(ie leads to central taxes being lower than they otherwise would have been), then the
overall level of revenue mobilization is dampened. If subnational government taxes
do not crowd out, total revenue mobilization is enhanced by higher levels of subnational government taxation. Crowding out can be an important determinant of
revenue assignment to subnational governments.
How does crowding out happen?
Subnational government taxing power may lead to an encroachment on the tax base of
the central government. The result of higher local government taxes may be that voters
will resist future increases in central government tax rates. In effect, the introduction of
tax-base sharing causes a reduction in the fiscal capacity of the central government.
There may also be an output effect, depending on the price elasticity of demand for the
goods that are taxed, and the elasticity of substitution between inputs. The underlying
argument is that the voters are concerned with the total tax burden, rather than with
the burden imposed by each level of government.
Crowding out might be argued for either industrial or developing countries, but
the case is more plausible in higher-income countries. One reason is that tax systems
are more transparent, and taxpayers better understand how to use the vote. Moreover, in some OECD countries the income tax (Spain and the Nordic countries)
and consumption tax (the United States and Canada) bases are formally shared.
This makes matters even more transparent. A related issue is that higher joint
tax rates and dual administration might lead to reduced compliance rates. For
example, Plamondon and Zussman (1998) estimate that a single administration of
the Canadian federal and provincial business taxes would reduce compliance costs
by 1.3% of collections.
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Stimulative effects
A reason to expect that decentralization will have a stimulative effect on overall tax
effort is that subnational governments have some comparative, administrative advantages in reaching even the traditional income, consumption, and wealth tax bases.
Some of those who are hard to tax under central government regimes may be less
hard to tax by provincial and local governments. The result of tax decentralization in
such cases may be a net revenue gain. This argument better fits the case of developing
and transition countries where the central government tax administration does not
effectively reach the legal tax base (Bahl and Bird, 2008).
These `informational advantages' of subnational governments can take many
forms. Often, for instance, state and local governments oversee a variety of licensing
and regulatory activities, and they track property ownership and land-based transactions. They thus have better opportunity to identify businesses in the community and
to gain some knowledge about their assets and scale of operation. Because the
potential revenue gain is much more important for them in relative terms, subnational governments have more incentive to carry out such activities than do national
governments. This provincial and local government knowledge of the tax base may
allow them to capture some of those who presently do not fully comply, or evade taxes
altogether. This would include the self-employedöincluding small businesses öwho
often underdeclare taxable income and consumption.
There is another factor that suggests a revenue enhancement effect from decentralization. `New taxation' might lead to an overall revenue increase. In many countries,
provincial and local governments have broadened their tax net with a variety of special
tax instruments and administrative measures such as levies on the sales of assets of
firms, licenses to operate, betterment charges, and various forms of property and land
taxation (Bird, 2008).
What is the verdict? Does increased subnational government taxation crowd out
central revenues and reduce overall revenue mobilization, or is it revenue enhancing,
and is there a difference in this regard between industrialized and low-income countries? There is not much empirical evidence on the question of whether subnational
government taxes crowd out central taxes, or whether they stimulate overall tax effort.
Apparently, intangible factors such as fiscal culture and fiscal education matter a great
deal. Lotz (2006) has observed with impressionistic evidence from OECD countries
that there is no clear conclusion as to whether decentralized taxation power leads to an
increase in the overall level of taxation.
Empirical model and specification
We provide a systematic test of the crowding out hypothesis, using data from industrialized and low-income countries. Consistent with the hypothesis here, the dependent
variable is specified as central government tax revenues as a percentage of GDP.
Measuring the dependent variable in this way raises a comparability problem because
the central government tax ratio will vary across countries depending on the tax
assignment that they make. In this analysis we control for this problem by including
subnational government taxes as a percentage of GDP as an (endogenous) independent
variable.
The other independent variables are meant to capture differences in taxable
capacity, as has been the tradition in the earlier tax effort studies. All else being held
equal, we expect that industrial countries will mobilize a greater share of GDP in
taxes, and so we introduce per capita GDP as an independent variable. The agricultural sector share of GDP is included to show the (presumed) lower taxable capacity
in countries whose economies are more reliant on agriculture. The degree of openness
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in the economy (the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP) is used to
capture the tax-base-enhancing effects of trade. In the case of developing countries,
trade provides a `tax handle' that helps circumvent tax administration constraints
(Bahl, 1971; Lotz and Morss, 1967). In the case of industrial countries it reflects a
stronger economy and greater taxable capacity. On the other hand, trade liberalization
and the zero rating of exports might cause us to expect that the marginal effect of
openness on central tax effort would be negative.
The ratio of subnational government taxes to GDP is introduced as the (endogenous)
tax decentralization measure. If there is a crowding-out effect, there should be a significant
negative effect of the subnational government tax variable on the ratio of central government taxes to GDP. Further, as argued above, the expectation is that crowding out will be
more likely where there is a larger subnational government tax sector, because these
countries will have assigned the broad-based taxes to the lower levels of government.
Where subnational governments have been given less access to broad-based taxes, there
may be no crowding out at all when subnational government taxes rise. Therefore, we also
include a squared term for the subnational government tax variable.
Estimation and results
Consistent with the crowding-out hypothesis, the share of subnational government taxes
in total taxes is treated as endogenous.(3) The level of subnational government taxes is
determined in part by the tax assignments they have been given.
Data are drawn from a panel of seventy industrialized and developing countries
created for the 1990 ^ 2003 period. Fiscal data are from the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) (1980 ^ 2006) and the independent variables are from the World Bank
(2006). The IMF data have been criticized because of their limited coverage of
subnational government taxes, and because they do not account for the amount
of discretion that subnational governments have in revenue mobilization (Ebel and
Yilmaz, 2003). Some observations were missing for some years and were dropped.
This unbalanced sample was used in the estimation. Fixed effects were introduced
to account for country-specific factors.
The instruments used for the endogenous variable, the subnational government
share of GDP, are population density, the labor force participation rate, industrial
value added, and electricity consumption per capita. All of these instruments may be
thought of as tax handles that are associated with a higher level of taxable capacity for
subnational governments. To test the validity of our instruments we calculate F-test
values in the ranges of 14.96 to 7.91, and 16.70 to 10.08, for the first-stage regressions
for the subnational tax ratio and subnational tax ratio squared following Bound et al
(1995). The F-test values are greater than the critical values calculated by Stock and
Yogo (2002; table 2) for a desired maximal size of a 5% Wald test. We also obtained
p-values of less than 0.005 for the Anderson-Rubin statistic and concluded that the
instruments were robust for inference (Baum et al, 2003). Statistics are robust to
heteroskedasticity. For the exclusion restriction we obtained a p-value of 0.9010 for
the Hansen J-test for overidentification and were not able to reject the null hypothesis
that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term.
The results for the structural equation are presented in table 2. The nonlinear
relationship between the level of subnational taxes and the level of central taxes is
significant, with an inverted U shape. At lower levels of subnational government
taxes, there is a positive (additive) effect, and at higher levels there is evidence of a
crowding-out effect.
(3) In the Hausman test for endogeneity we obtain a w2 value of ÿ48.28 but the model fitted on
these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman test.
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Table 2. Regression estimates of the determinants of variations in central government taxes
as a percentage of GDP: instrumental variables estimates (second stage), 1990 to 2003.
Variables

Two-stage least squares
specification A specification B

Subnational government taxes
as a percentage of GDP a
Square value of subnational government
taxes as a percentage of GDP

2.139***
(0.00902)
ÿ0.124*
(0.0728)

Agriculture sector share of GDP

0.280***
(2.04  10ÿ5 )

Per capita GDP (US $)

0.277***
(0.00227)

Value of imports plus exports as
a share of GDP
First-stage F-test

ÿ0.0364***
(0.00333)
14.56
7.91

2.653***
(0.00697)
ÿ0.160**
(0.0357)
0.271***
(0.000427)

Limited
likelihood
coefficients
2.157***
(0.00935)
ÿ0.125*
(0.0743)
0.280***
(2.22  10ÿ5 )
0.276***
(0.00239)

ÿ0.0459***
(0.00164)
16.70
10.08

ÿ0.0364***
(0.00359)
14.56
7.91

First-stage p-value

0.0000
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

0.0000
0.0000

First-stage partial R 2 of excluded
instruments

0.0854
0.0304

0.0736
0.0279

0.0854
0.0304

***Significance at 0.001 level; **significance at 0.05; *significance at 0.1 level.
Notes: Estimated with an unbalanced panel for fifty-five countries for the period 1990 to 2003;
estimation with country fixed effects; N  520; standard errors are given below the coefficients
in parentheses.
a Instruments are rural populations as a percentage of total population, population
density measured as the population per square kilometer, electricity consumption measured as
kWh per capita, and labor force participation rate measured as the percentage of population
over 15 years of age.

As expected, the level of central government revenue mobilization is positively and
significantly related to the level of per capita GDP. The trade variable is negative
and significant, indicating that, for any given level of per capita income, open economies
do not give up significantly greater levels of central tax revenues. The agricultural share of
GDP is significant but does not have the expected sign. Bird et al (2006) obtained similar
results for the agriculture and trade variables in their tax effort analysis.
The same analysis was repeated excluding the per capita GDP as an independent
variable, and there was little change in the results, as reported in table 2. We also use a
limited likelihood (LIML) estimation to control for weak instruments [in line with
Fuller (1977)] but found little change in the results, also reported in table 2. We
reestimated the model with the central and subnational taxes in logarithmic terms
but there was no major change in the results.
From these results we can say that the estimated response of central government
taxes revenues (CT) to a difference in subnational government tax revenues (SNT), both
adjusted for the level of GDP and all else held constant, is
qCT
 2:139 ÿ 0:248SNT .
qSNT
From this equation we estimate that crowding out occurs after the subnational tax
ratio reaches 8.63% of GDP. When we drop the agricultural share of GDP from the
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equation, the crowding out threshold drops to 8.29% of GDP. Raising local taxes
in countries with a low effective tax rate at the subnational government level is likely
to add to overall revenue mobilization, perhaps because the increased burden will
not be so noticeable. But in countries where the local burden is high and transparent
(for example, the Nordic countries), increased subnational government taxes are more
likely to crowd out central government tax revenues.
Summary and conclusions
The economic theory of tax assignment leads to a conclusion that the level of subnational
government taxes should more or less match the level of subnational government expenditures that are characterized by local benefits. Moreover, these expenditures should be
financed by taxes whose burden falls on beneficiaries. This points toward residence-based
individual income and payroll taxes, destination-based sales taxes, property and land
taxes, and various forms of licenses and user charges as the best choices for local
government taxes. It is up to the central government (or the constitution) to work out a
tax assignment that gives this balance. Grants should be restricted to dealing with services
where there are national or regional priorities, and with equalization.
The real world of tax assignment has drifted from the model. The overall level of
subnational government taxes is much higher in most industrialized countries than in
developing countriesöthat is, the vertical imbalance in the intergovernmental fiscal
system is greater in the developing countries. Moreover, while subnational governments in many OECD countries use individual income taxes, destination-based sales
taxes, and property taxes, as the theory would prescribe, the developing countries do
not. The question raised in the above discussion is why the practice follows the theory
in some types of countries but not in others.
The discussion in this paper considers four reasons. First, the accountability feature
that is the basis for arguing the importance of local government taxation often does
not lead to a capturing of the welfare gains from fiscal decentralization in developing
countries. This is because a popular voting regime is not in place or because voters do
not have the information necessary to effectively use the vote. Second, tax decentralization may lead to unacceptable fiscal disparities and in such cases equalization schemes
become problematic. Third, tax administration costs are higher for subnational governments than for central governments, and narrowing this differential may not fit the
interests of centralists. Fourth, there is a fear at the central level that giving more
discretionary taxing powers to local governments will lead to a crowding out of central
revenues.
The result of all of this is a kind of perfect storm where the elements have come
together to dampen the relative level of subnational government taxation in developing
countries. Central governments generally do not want to give up taxing powers for
political or perhaps macroeconomic reasons. Elected officials in subnational governments are not enthusiastic about the accountability that comes with taxing power, and
local voters have neither the information (nor perhaps even the vote) to push for such a
change. The weak tax administration capabilities of subnational governments provide
good cover for not moving toward the decentralization of taxation powers.
As a matter of public policy, however, tax centralization may exacerbate some
fiscal problems in low-income countries. Fiscal discipline rules in industrialized
countries are usually based on discretionary local taxing powers and an intergovernmental transfer system that forces a hard budget constraint on the lower level
governments. Without significant taxing powers, the avenues to budget balance that
are open to subnational governments are to reduce spending, to borrow, or to lobby
the higher level government for additional transfers.
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Bahl R, Mart|¨ nez-Väzquez J, 2008, ``The property tax in developing countries: current practice and
prospects'', in Making the PropertyTaxWork: Experiences in Developing and Transitional Countries
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